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Abstract
Recent developments in private payments arrangements, particu-
larly at the wholesale level, (including recent innovations in China)
challenge central banks’ longstanding monopoly on the provision of
the ultimate means of settlement for financial transactions. This pa-
per examines competition between public payments arrangements and
private intermediaries, and the eﬀect on central banks’ role in mon-
etary policy. Central to the issue is the role of collateral both as
a requirement for participation in central bank sponsored payments
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arrangements and as the backing for private intermediary arrange-
ments. The presence of private systems serves as a check on the
ability of a monetary authority to tighten monetary policy.
Over recent decades, payments arrangements have undergone unprece-
dented changes. Nonetheless, standard macroeconomics continues to treat
payments as primarily based on public systems. Roughly speaking the basic
model is one in which commercial banks rely on the central bank’s reserves in
order to make payments. In turn, the central bank engages in monetary pol-
icy by aﬀecting the aggregate amount of reserves, trading non-reserve assets
for reserve assets, and thereby in a more-or-less mechanical way increasing
the totality of assets which can be used as means of payments–that is, the
money supply.
This view of payments arrangements, with government fiat money as the
base and centerpiece of a modern economy’s methods of payments, is at odds
with a host of developments in private payments arrangements over recent
decades.1 It is true that some recent payments innovations arguably leave
the basic structure unaltered: While the rise of credit cards has been an
important change in payment for retail economic activity, it might still be
claimed that it makes no “fundamental” diﬀerence to the system, because,
at the end of the month, every transaction translates one-for-one into a pay-
ment (or almost every transaction–default does occur), and that payment
passes through an account in some commercial bank somewhere. And since
commercial banks “ultimately” depend on central bank reserves and “ul-
timately” settle with one another through central bank payments systems,
central banks are still at the core of the arrangement–with only a money
multiplier as a minor caveat.
Other developments, however, cannot so easily be dismissed. In the UK,
the increased concentration of payments into a handful of major settlement
banks through “tiering” has meant that an increasing proportion of economic
activity is payed through “on-us” transfers within a bank’s accounts, never
reaching the central system. Intrabank activity is increasingly likely to take
place through private settlement arrangements. In the US, CHIPS–a pri-
vate, cooperatively-owned arrangement among major financial institutions–
has activity equal to something like 80% of the value of the activity on Fed-
wire, the Federal Reserve’s system. And although net settlement on CHIPS
1For an introduction, see Kahn and Roberds (2008); for an extensive history of insti-
tutions see Manning et al (2008).
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passes through Fedwire at the end of the day, the techniques used by CHIPS
to eﬀect netting of payments among its participants means that the amounts
appearing on Fedwire are orders of magnitude smaller than the actual activ-
ity.2 The story is the same for CLS, the recently developed private system
for settling international, multicurrency transactions.3 Throughput on this
system is now fifteen times world GDP, and one hundred times the ulti-
mate settlement of these transactions on central bank books. Not only is
transactions velocity staggering on these advanced netting systems, it varies
radically with economic conditions–in recent unsettled periods, daily value
of transactions on CLS were double the “normal” high-volume days. In other
words, the variations are unaﬀected by central bank activity.
Perhaps most challenging from the point of view of central bankers is
the rise in private “oﬀshore” settlement arrangements. In Hong Kong, in
particular, two major banks have set up entirely private arrangements for
making payments in both dollars and sterling. These systems have no oﬃcial
connection–legal or regulatory–to the U.S. or the U.K. Value and volume
on these systems does not depend on the institutions holdings of British or
American central bank reserves; instead it is determined by demands for the
service in the Far East, and its capacity is constrained only by limits to the
reputation of the banks running the arrangements. (Similar arrangements
are available in India and are now becoming available in the rest of China).4
For several years theoretical monetary economists have pondered what it
would mean for central bank reserves no longer to serve as the “ultimate”
means of settlement.5 But the developments have made clear that central
banks reserves could cease to be relevant long before they cease to be ulti-
mate. In other words, the capacity of a private payments system to carry
out transactions relies less and less on the degree to which the system has
access to government reserves, and more and more on the credibility of the
2For a discussion of the complementary and competitive relationships between CHIPS
and Fedwire, see Rochet and Tirole (1996). Figures on Fedwire and CHIPS can be found
in Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2010).
3For an early introduction to CLS see Kahn and Roberds (2001).
4An earlier example was a dollar system set up in Japan by Chase-Tokyo (an example
for which I thank Bruce Summers). The Eurodollar market is an even earlier example.
To the extent that the bank setting up the system has a presence in the country of the
currency, the regulator retains leverage over it. It is thus particularly noteworthy that
in the case of China, the banks in charge of the payments arrangements are primarily
Chinese entities.
5For opposing views see Goodhart (2000), Woodford (2000).
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institution as an ongoing entity. It is not reserves which back the system and
limit its scale but attachable assets of reliable value–collateral.
Collateral is also central to participation in public payments arrange-
ments. In CHAPS and TARGET–the large value systems of, respectively,
the Bank of England and the European Central Bank–collateral must be
posted by participants in order to have access to overdrafts on their accounts
needed for engaging in transactions during the course of the day. While inter-
est rates on the collateralized borrowing are extremely low, they still carry
an opportunity cost: collateral tied up in central bank systems cannot be
used for backing other activity.
Since the amount of money (overdrafts and reserves) in a system during
the daylight hours far exceeds the reserves on central bank books overnight,
a disconnect has begun to arise between two forms of “monetary” policy–
daylight and overnight–for which government collateral policy and interest
rates diﬀer. For major particpants these intraday collateral requirements
are likely to be more significant than the reserve requirements established
by the central banks on overnight positions. (Fedwire, unusually among
central bank systems, allows uncollateralized intraday overdrafts, but in eﬀect
makes the same restrictions through more informal means.) Evidence of
the significance of the collateral requirements for participants in CHAPS
and TARGET comes from the pressure these banks have brought on the
institutions to allow greater flexibility in these requirements.6
How can we make sense of these changes? How do financial institutions
decide on the use of their collateral and their participation in these systems?
What are the consequences for operation of payments systems and for the
eﬀectiveness of central bank monetary policy? In this paper we will make
a start at answering these questions by developing a model of competition
between public and private payments arrrangements. While a monetary au-
6And while this is going on within individual national payment systems, increasingly
global banking conglomerates are handling payments around the world on a 24 hour basis.
The latest twist in this environment is the increasing ease with which collateral can be
transferred into and out of national payment system arrangements. Within the trading
day, banks now can increase or decrease the collateral in a system, readjusting its use for
other activities. Central banks have aided the process by increasingly allowing members
to use as collateral securities of foreign governments. And the rise of agreements between
central banks for easy shifting of collateral from one national system to another means
that the day is not far oﬀ when collateral could be shifted around the world following
the trading activities of payments systems around the clock. See Kahn (2009) for an
application of the models of this paper to “round-the-clock” payments arrangements.
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thority will have interest rate policies available to it, a central role in the
model will be played by collateral, and the real eﬀects of the system will be
related to costs of generating collateral.
Sometimes the costs of collateral have been ignored in analyzing payments
arrangements or monetary policy–as if there were a sea of the stuﬀ out there,
so large that it can be pressed into service as needed for free. In periods of
liquidity crisis, as we have seen recently, this is clearly not the case.7 But even
in normal times, when the costs of putting existing collateral into service are
small, a bank’s managers must weigh the costs of including in its portfolio
assets that can be collateralized should the need arise as opposed to more
lucrative, but more opaque non collateralizable investments. These decisions
may well have significant eﬀects on an economy.
It is probable that over recent decades, the cost of provision of collateral
has decreased, and the elasticity of supply of collateral has increased. But
what the eﬀects of this on payments activity and monetary policy are is less
clear, particularly in the presence of private payments competition. The
models of this paper are intended as a starting point for addressing such
questions.
The model we develop is an extension of Berentsen-Monnet (2008) to
examine competition between private and public payment systems, focusing
on collateral as both a constraint on private systems and a policy choice for
public systems. Berentsen-Monnet in turn is based on Lagos-Wright (2005)’s
“day-night” models.8 As this is a first attempt to address these issues, many
simplifications will be included. We will focus on tradeoﬀs between the costs
of collateralization and current consumption; the possibility of additional pro-
ductive investments will be ignored. We will focus on the situation where
central banks use “channel systems” to carry out monetary policy–that is,
they establish nominal lending and borrowing rates for central bank funds.
However, we will compare the results at several points with the case where
at least part of the money supply is outside money. Since we adopt the
quasi-linearity of the Lagos-Wright framework, there will be no long-term
risk aversion motivating the holding of liquid assets. The role of money is
solely a means of payment and the need for a means of payment arises solely
from the problem of limited enforcement. Individuals face uncertainty about
7See for example Heider and Hoerova (2009).
8For another approach to modeling payments systems in Lagos-Wright models, see
Sanches (2009).
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demand for consumption, which leads to a precautionary motive for money
holding. There is no aggregate uncertainty–an extension which will be im-
portant for linking the model to more macroeconomic issues. Nonetheless,
competition between private and public payments arrangements will have
important consequences for policy, even in this extremely simple set-up.
1 The model
Agents have a common discount factor  per day. Each day is divided into
two periods; for convenience there is no discounting between periods within
a day. In the first period (“morning”) all individuals are identifiable. In the
second (“afternoon”) individuals are anonymous; thus they will need a means
of payment to make purchases in this period.
There are two goods; one can be produced and consumed in the mornings
and the other can be produced and consumed in the afternoons. All agents
can produce morning goods at a cost of 1 per unit. If consumed immediately,
the morning good gives a utility of 1 per unit. If a unit is produced one morn-
ing and placed in a storage technology (available to all agents), it provides 
units of utility the following morning. We will assume that   1 so that
agents will not desire, in the absence of other considerations, to produce for
storage.
Each period an individual faces uncertainty about preferences and pro-
ductivity with respect to afternoon good. In each period a fraction  of
the agents can produce but not consume afternoon good. For such agents
the cost of production is 1 per unit. A fraction 1 −  can consume and
not produce. For such agents utility is (), an increasing concave function
satisfying the Inada conditions. Individuals learn which group they belong
to in any period at the beginning of the afternoon; these draws are serially
uncorrelated. The afternoon good is not storable.
We number periods  = {0 1 2 } even numbers denoting morning pe-
riods. For  even, let  be an agent’s net production of newly produced
morning good at time  (production less consumption), +1 his production
of afternoon good if the agent is an afternoon producer and +1 his consump-
tion of afternoon good if the agent is an afternoon consumer at time  + 1,
and +2 consumption in period + 2 of morning good stored from period .
The quantities  can be positive or negative;   and +2 must be non
negative.
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For ease of presentation, we will focus on three periods, a morning (period
0) an afternoon (period 1) and the following morning (period 2). Then an
agent’s expected utility over the three periods is
−0 − 1 + (1− )(1)− 2 + 2
Consumption in period 2 can depend on the period 1 realizations; we will let
subscripts  and  denote period 2 choices conditional on the agent turning
out to be a buyer or seller respectively in period 1 The so-called “quasi-
linearity” of the utility function (Lagos-Wright, 2005) allows us to isolate
the problem to these three periods when convenient.
2 Non-Monetary Equilibria
We begin by considering equilibria in this economy in the absence of monetary
instruments. We will consider two possibilities: one in which agents are
“trustworthy,” so that afternoon trades can be handled by uncollateralized
credit, and another in which the storable commodity is exchanged to resolve
the problem of anonymity in afternoon markets. We let +2 ( even) represent
the period +2 price of morning good produced in period  relative to newly
produced morning good.
2.1 Trustworthy agents
Proposition 1 If agents are trustworthy, then in any equilibrium, afternoon
consumers consume ∗ units of afternoon good, where
0(∗) = 1 (1)
No storage occurs in equilbrium, and for  even,
−1 ≥ +2 ≥ 
This proposition is proved in appendix A.3. We will call ∗ the eﬃcient
or “full-trust” level of output. Appendix A.1 shows that equilibrium with
trustworthy agents is equivalent to aWalrasian equilibrium. In theWalrasian
equilbrium, prices deflate period by period at the rate  meaning that indi-
viduals are indiﬀerent between choices of working one period or the next, or
of consuming newly produced morning good one period or another.
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It is also useful to consider the relative price of afternoon goods in terms
of various morning goods in this Walrasian equilibrum. Afternoon good in
period one trades one-for-one for morning good in period 0; thus afternoon
good has a price −1 relative to morning good of period 2. Its shadow price
relative to the morning good stored from period 0 to period 2 is in the range
[1 ()−1]  (The amount stored in the equilibrium is in fact zero, but if we
were to perturb the equilibrium slightly by providing some old morning good
in period 2 (or in period 1), then ()−1 would be the price of afternoon
good relative to this old morning good.)
Because of the linearity of costs and of preferences for morning goods,
individual consumptions and productions of morning good are indeterminate.
However, when comparing this economy with the rest of our examples in
which agents are not trustworthy, it is natural to focus on the allocation
in which all “debts” are paid the next period. In other words, afternoon
consumers provide output the next morning equal in value to their previous
afternoon consumption–that is, each provides
∗

units of morning good, and each ex-producer receives
1− 

∗
 
2.2 Commodity payment
Given that agents are not trustworthy, it will not be possible to borrow
for consumption in the afternoon market. An afternoon consumer could,
nonetheless, pay by trading with stored good. We can think of each agent
as producing in period  the amount +2 for storage; if he is an afternoon
consumer, he will pay for consumption with stored good; if he is an after-
noon producer he will hold his stored good plus any afternoon receipts for
consumption the next morning. In this case, the resultant equilibria contain
the analogue of a cash-in-advance constraint: each agent maximizes utility
subject to period-by-period budget constraints, including the requirement
that
+1+2 ≥ +1
for  even, where +2 is the amount of period  morning good stored (and
ultimately consumed by someone in period +2), and +1 is the “spot price”
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of afternoon good in period +1 relative to stored morning good. Note that
production of +2 cannot depend on whether the agent turns out to be a
consumer or producer in period + 1
Determination of equilibrium in this case is aided by the following con-
siderations: As of the afternoon, producers value the stored morning good at
 per unit. Given constant marginal costs, sellers make zero profits in the
afternoon. Since agents do not know whether they will be sellers or buyers,
they choose a storage level  in the morning to solve the following problem:
max −+ (1− )() + 
In other words, if buyers, they sell their storage for afternoon good; if
sellers, they hold their own storage until the next period. Since  =  we
have the first order condition:
−1 + (1− )0() +  = 0
Armed with this information one can quickly verify the first part of the
following proposition. The entirety is proved in appendix A.3.
Proposition 2 If agents can only pay for afternoon consumption with stored
morning goods then in the competitive equilibrium afternoon consumers con-
sume e where
()−1 − 
1−  = 
0(e) (2)
In equilibrium, for  even
+2 = 
+1 = 
We will call e, the level of consumption under commodity payment (“the
barter level”). Since there is no intertemporal market on which afternoon
good can be sold we only have spot rates of exchange between the two goods
available for trade. Note that the left side of the equation defining e is greater
than 1 so that e  ∗
and afternoon good becomes expensive relative to stored morning good.
Note that agents anticipate a capital loss on the stored good. They are
willing to store the good despite the fact its value will shrink with certainty
between period 0 and period 1. The diﬀerence is the liquidity premium on
the morning good.
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2.3 Collateralized Borrowing
This equilibrium can be given a second interpretation: suppose rather than
using the stored good as an outright payment, the agents treat it as collateral;
the good is held by the seller until period 2 when it is returned to the buyer
in return for new morning good of equal value. Clearly this interpretation
makes no substantive change in the account. But it does allow us to extend
the analysis to the case where the collateral value is greater or less than the
value of the goods purchased with it. It also allows us explicitly to consider
interest rates for borrowing or lending between periods 1 and 2. We will
include that possibility in considering the individual maximization problem,
with two diﬀerent rates. Of course, in the competitive equilibrium, borrowing
and lending rates will be the same, but by treating them separately we will
be able to use the analysis for more general situations later.
Specifically, assume traders in the afternoon engage in a “repo” transac-
tion: buyers borrow by making a loan of morning good which will then be
returned the following morning when the borrowing is repaid. Now buyers
rather than sellers consume the old morning good, and instead buyers pro-
duce new morning good to make their payments. With linear technologies
this exchange is a wash. Now we can consider “haircuts”–transactions in
which the value of the collateral exceeds the value the goods received–and
“loans on margin”–in which the collateral only represents a fraction of the
loan value. To the extent that there are non-pecuniary costs to default, it
is not necessary to require full collateral to ensure repayment. To the extent
that there may be adverse selection in the collateral posted, collateral value
on average will have to exceed the value of the loan.
We will let  denote the fraction of the loan value which must be collater-
alized; thus   1 represents an incompletely collateralized loan, and   1
represents a haircut. Thus  = 0 is the equivalent of trustworthy agents;
 =∞ is an economy where commodities cannot be used to make purchases
(in other words, autarky, in the absence of government-provided money).
At a cost of 1 an individual manufactures a collateral good in the morning.
He can use it to guarantee payment for purchase in the afternoon and will,
in any case consume the collateral good the next day, at a present value
of  per unit. Thus the net cost of collateral provision is (1 − ) In
the afternoon suppliers produce and demanders purchase afternoon good.
The collateral good gives an inferior amount of consumption in period 2,
but relaxes the constraint on afternoon consumption. The agent’s problem
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becomes
max≥0−+ (1− )()−  + − (1− ) + 
subject to
−1 ≥ 
Here  is the price of afternoon good in terms of period 2 morning good.
Because of constant returns to scale, and positive production, we have that
 = −1; in equilibrium the relative price of afternoon good and good the
subsequent morning must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween them. As the appendix shows, the first order conditions reduce to the
following:
0() = 1 + ()
−1 − 1
1−  (3)
We can use the condition to implicitly define a function ˜(); the equilib-
rium output level for given collateral requirements. If  = 1 this condition
reduces to the condition (2) determining the level of output under commodity
payment. As  approaches 0 the condition approaches (1) and consumption
approaches the trustworthy agents case. In general output decreases with
increasing costs of using the system (increases in  or decreases in ).
3 Government Monopoly on Money
Next we consider a government which has a monopoly on the provision of
means of payment in the economy. Let  ( even) denote the nominal period
 price of newly produced morning good, and  ( odd) denote the period
 price of afternoon good. The cleanest case to consider is the case of zero
initial money balances: Each morning, government supplies money elastically
at fixed terms; with repayment to the government on the next morning. In
Appendix A.4, we show that the results carry over to the case where agents
begin the initial period with a positive stock of nominal money balances,
and consider as well the case of a steady state monetary policy, in which
government adjusts money supply to maintain a constant real balance and
constant rate of inflation. The analysis in this section and the corresponding
parts of the appendix closely follow Berentsen-Monnet (2008).
The first thing to note is that the level of prices in the model is indetermi-
nate. In other words, for arbitrary positive 2, the government can make an
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announcement of a willingness to buy or sell 2 units of money in return for
one unit of morning goods in period 2. While government supply of money
is then completely elastic at this price, private agents’ aggregate supply of
and demand for money in period 2 are completely inelastic and equal. Thus
money trades at the government’s specified price. However the real money
supply is independent of the stated price. Prices adjust so that by selling a
unit of afternoon good, a producer can purchase 1 units of period 2 morn-
ing good. If there is no opportunity cost associated with borrowing money
then each agent will borrow enough to purchase ∗ units. No storage of morn-
ing goods takes place, and the real per capita money supply in the economy
(call it the “overnight money supply”) is ∗ valued in period 1 goods, or
∗ valued in period 2 goods. In this case, the marginal rate of substitution
between morning and afternoon goods is 1 so that 0 = 2 that is, prices
deflate in line with the discount rate. If the process is repeated then in each
period a smaller nominal amount of government money is borrowed.
In this economy the government can conduct a monetary policy by estab-
lishing a (nominal) interest rate for money it lends to the public. Let the
interest rate be denoted  For completeness and clarity we can also consider
that anyone holding money at the end of the afternoon can deposit it with
the government overnight, and receive a deposit rate,  also determined by
the government. Clearly, all money supplied by the government will end up
in overnight deposits. Following Berentsen and Monnet, it is convenient to
use the proportional spread between interest rates
∆ = 1 + 
1 + 
as one indicator of the government’s policy. The government is restricted to
∆ ≥ 1; otherwise there will be arbitrage opportunities.
If the government sets the two rates to be equal (call it ), then there is
no real eﬀect. The government can announce an arbitrary value for money
on the following morning; given this value, the price of afternoon goods in
period 1 is 1 = (1+ )−12 and again each individual borrows enough to
purchase ∗ Valued at period 2 prices and including interest, the real value
of the money supply is unchanged. Valued at period 1 prices, it is smaller
by the anticipated interest payments. The interest payments are also built
into the inflation rate: 2
0 = (1 + )
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and if 1 +  = −1 prices remain constant, period to period.
On the other hand, a spread between the interest rates does have real
eﬀects. First note that with a spread in interest rates, the public must in
aggregate pay back more money on any day than is available to it. The
diﬀerence is assumed to be distributed lump-sum by the government to the
population as a whole; thus each pair of interest rates entails an associated
(negative) tax policy.9
As the interest rate spread increases, the use of money decreases. In this
case
0() = ∆ (4)
and 2
0 = ((1 + ) + (1− )(1 + )) (5)
(For a demonstration, see the results in appendix A.4, of which these cal-
culations are a special case). In other words, inflation is determined by the
average of interest rates faced by buyers and sellers, and economic activity
is reduced by the spread in rates.
In the United States until recently, that the monetary authorty did not
pay interest on monetary assets, so that  = 0 Then increases in the borrow-
ing rate on monetary assets decreases economic activity and reduces prices
today relative to future prices.
Note that as long as the interest rate spread remains low, no agent would
actually find it useful to attempt to use commodity money. However, as the
interest spread increases beyond a critical level
()−1 − 
1− 
an incentive arises to develop private alternatives to government money. The
next section considers competition between private and public providers of
payments services.
Of course a monetary authority could also require that participants pro-
vide collateral in return for borrowing. An individual who borrows one
dollar from the government must repay 1 +  the next morning. He must
post  dollars worth of collateral value per dollar owed (measured in next
period’s prices). He will pay 1 per unit of good bought. Thus he must
9By considering the possibility of rolling over borrowings of money, we could extend
the government’s space of policies, but without significant eﬀect on our analysis.
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post 1(1 + )(2). As a result, the level of consumption of afternoon
good falls further. Again, the Appendix A.4 carries out these calculations
in greater generality.
4 Competition between private and public sys-
tems
Nowwe consider competition between publicly-provided collateralized money
and private collateralized loans. The chosen mixture of payments systems
within the economy will depend on the costs imposed by the government
provided system. Government costs come in two forms—collateral require-
ments and interest spreads. Appendix A.5 provides a detailed model of
these choices, with mixture between private and public payments arrange-
ments responding smoothly to policy variables. Here we begin with brief
descriptions of a simplified account in which required collateral in the private
system takes a special form: a constant proportion of value to be borrowed.
In this case, the equilibrium solution has a “bang-bang” form: if the gov-
ernment chooses policy variables which are too high, all traﬃc moves from
the public system to the private system. In the more general case, collateral
required will be a convex function of the amounts borrowed.
4.1 Fixed proportions of collateral required
In this section we start with the problem in the even more special case where
interest charges on money balances are zero–that is, setting  = 010 What
is new in the arrangement is that the agents can choose between two ways
of providing payments. The agent’s problem becomes
max−+ (1− )()−  + + (1− ) + 
10The appendix deals in detail with the additional complications which arise when  is
no longer zero and the assumption of a linear collateral technology is dropped. The major
advantagea of the simpler account in the text are two: 1) We do not need to distinguish
prices for goods in diﬀerent payment systems (as opposed to, for example discounts or
surcharges that arise in the real world when using diﬀering forms of payment systems as
the costs of using them diverge). 2) We are able to aggregate the two collateral constraints
into a single constraint.
14
where
 =  + 
1 ≥ 2
−1 ≥ 2
−11+ −12 ≥ 1
The first constraint is the budget constraint if the agent turns out to
be a seller, the second is the budget constraint if the agent turns out to
be a buyer: either way, the sales in periods 1 must finance consumption
purchases in period 2 and vice versa. The third constraint is the collateral
constraint: any shortfall in payment for afternoon good that is not met by
private collateralized loans must be met by borrowed money. First order
conditions are listed in the appendix.
Now the choice of use of private or public payment simply boils down to
the question of which requires the more expensive haircut. Holding second
period prices fixed, an increase in the haircut on borrowing money lowers the
demand for money and reduces afternoon consumption. The reduction in
the afternoon consumption reduces demand for collateral and thus morning
prices of goods. However, once the haircut exceeds that required for private
borrowing, demand for money falls to zero, and further increases in haircuts
have no eﬀect on the economy. This does not aﬀect the money price of goods
in period 2; the government still continues to be willing to redeem money
from any holder at a price 2 Thus the amount of consumption of afternoon
good in the economy is
˜(min{ })
(recall that ˜() is implicitly defined by (3)).
Next, consider how the result changes if agents can either use interest
bearing publicly-provided money, or make private arrangements on their own.
In either case they must post collateral in advance. Money interest rates are
a policy variable of the government as before. The new consideration that
arises is that terms for private arrangements must be set competitively. Let 
be the money price in period 2 that a private borrower agrees to pay for a unit
of afternoon good purchased in period 1 The equivalent value in collateral in
period 2 is (2) A private borrower must post collateral  = (2)
per unit of afternoon good purchased in a private loan. An individual who
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borrows one dollar from the government must repay 1+  the next morning.
He must post  dollars of collateral value per dollar owed. He will pay 1
per unit of good bought. Thus he must post  = 1(1 + )(2).
A seller who receives a dollar in period 1 will deposit it overnight and
have (1 + ) dollars in period 2. Thus a seller who sells a unit for money
will have 1(1 + ) dollars in period 2. A seller who receives a promise to
pay for a unit will have  dollars in period 2.11 Thus for a seller to be
indiﬀerent between methods, it must be that
 = 1(1 + ) (6)
For the two methods to co-exist, Appendix A.5 shows that the following
condition must hold:
∆(1 +  ()
−1 − 1
1−  ) = 1 + 
()−1 − 1
1−  
If the left side is greater, then only private payment arrangements are used,
and the equilibrium is as in section 3. If the right side is greater, only public
payment arrangements are used and the equilibrium is as in section 2.
For example, as the government increases the spread ∆ activity in the
economy falls, until the spread reaches the level
1− + (()−1 − 1)
1− + (()−1 − 1)
From then on, further spreads have no eﬀect, since the economy substitutes
private payments arrangements for public ones. Similarly, increasing interest
rate levels aﬀects inflation. However, once the critical level is exceeded,
then this has no significance: since public money is not actually used, the
private loans could be denominated in any real good, and inflation would be
irrelevant.
4.2 Variable Collateral Requirements for Private Loans
So far we have not addressed the issue of the source of the collateral re-
quirements. While public requirements are largely a policy variable, private
11We can be casual about the medium of exchange used in period 0, because in equilib-
rium no exchange will actually take place.
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requirements depend on reliability, information, incentives and enforcement
considerations. In practice, payments arrangements have collateral require-
ments which vary with the identity of the participants and the amount of
their participation. Private systems place a variety of restrictions on mem-
bership and collateral requirements for participants, including diﬀerentiation
between various classes of participants. As a result, only the larger and (pre-
sumably) better collateralized institutions participate in the private systems
directly.
Appendix A.5 considers the possibility that collateral requirements are
an increasing convex function of the value borrowed. The important con-
sequence is that changes in the collateral requirements of the public system
yield continuous responses in the use of the private system. For example,
increased collateral requirements in the public system induce a move to the
private system by some institutions who would formerly have found the pri-
vate requirements too stringent.
5 Monetary Policy when Private Payment Com-
petes
The above analysis makes clear that, at least to the extent that monetary
policy is intended to aﬀect the real economy, it can do so by changing the
margin along which agents divide between the use of private and public pay-
ment systems. In particular, in this model when payment requires the use of
costly collateral, agents will increase their production of such collateral, dis-
torting the trade-oﬀ between collateral-dependent and collateral-independent
purcahses. In a more general model this would translate to a “liquidity pref-
erence” decision–a choice of dividing investments between collateralizable
and (presumably higher return) uncollateralizable assets.
However, in the model, this power to aﬀect the real economy is self-
limiting. As the monetary authority increases the expense of using the public
system, by increasing collateral requirements or by increasing the interest rate
on borrowed money, agents abandon the public system. In the extreme, all
activity takes place through private payments and the monetary authority
is unable to eﬀect further tightening on the economy. Monetary policy
retains the ability to aﬀect the price level–that is, the posted money price
for goods. But it is a Pyrrhic victory: the activity of the economy can
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actually be carried out in real terms, with private lending based on real
interest rates and repayments specified in real terms. The “oﬃcial” nominal
prices are only of academic interest.
Several important limitations remain on the analysis as presented in this
paper. Probably the most important one is the lack of aggregate shocks.
Given that monetary policy is a tool for stabilization, introduction of such
shocks into the model is a priority. A second important aspect of ignoring
economy wide shocks is that this tends to bias our analysis in favor of private
systems. In times of distress, many patrons of private systems are likely to
switch to use of a public system because of its extra safety. (See the discussion
in Summers, 1998. For a historical examination of other preceived drawbacks
to private payments arrangements, see Summers and Gilbert, 1996).
The model also ignores the central feature of neo-Keynesian analysis:
price stickiness. To the extent that prices are posted and sticky nominally,
the authority retains some power. But as the private payments arrangements
take over, we could easily imagine that the pricing of the private system is
indexed to something other than the oﬃcial currency, and that agents in the
economy find it more convenient to price in those terms. Of course this is
the situation observed in chronic inflations, where prices become pegged to
a stable foreign currency. Governments will take comfort in the fact that
this movement to indexation of everyday prices does not appear to occur for
moderate levels of inflation.
Additional generalizations to the model are also desirable, the most im-
portant among them being endogenizing the haircut  by developing better
microfoundations for collateral, and allowing for competing investment goods
with positive returns (along these lines see for example Heider and Hoerova
(2009), Williamson (2010), and Li and Rocheteau (2009)).
6 Literature
The Berentsen Monnet model can be regarded as a formalization of the ideas
of Woodford (2000 et seq.) about conducting monetary policy in a world
with no outside money. The macroeconomic role of money as a medium
of exchange has also been explored in numerous cash-in-advance models; in
most of them, however, there is no flexibility in the use of publicly provided
cash in payment for so-called cash goods. A recent partial exception is Sauer
(2007), which examines the trade in which investors can sell illiquid shares
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or liquidate assets in order to trade by making payments on a goods market.
In his model the central bank can prevent this liquidation by entering a repo
market.
The issue of private competition with public payments arrangements is,
of course, not new.12 In an important early paper Wallace (1983) argues, in
the context of retail payment systems, that the only reasons that U.S. gov-
ernment issued interest bearing securities do not replace non-interest bearing
Federal Reserve Notes as a transaction medium are their non-negotiability (in
the case of savings bonds) and limitation to large denominations (in the case
of treasury bills). But private intermediaries could solve the latter problem
in particular, and make a profit, by establishing narrow banks which hold
large value treasuries and issue small-denomination, riskless private notes
suitable for payment. The lack of such notes in the U.S. is clearly due to
legal restriction (notably, in Scotland, such legal restrictions are still not in
place, and commercial banks do issue their own circulating notes). In an in-
triguing footnote (p.4), Wallace asks if checking accounts might in eﬀect play
the same role. He then states that “interest ceilings, reserve requirements,
zero marginal-cost check clearing by the Federal Reserve and the failure to
tax income in the form of transaction services ... explain the way checking
account services have been priced.” In the context of retail banking in the
U.S. nowadays,it is hard to argue that any of these considerations make a
significant diﬀerence. Thus the following sentences of the footnote become
the relevant ones: “In the absence of these forms of government interference,
most observers predict that checking accounts would pay interest at the mar-
ket rate with charges levied on a per transaction basis”–a prediction that
seems largely to have come true.
But then, in Wallace’s view, provided the public and private arrange-
ments have the same ability to eﬀect payments, an open market operation
which reduces the available reserves of treasury bills to commercial banks and
substitutes central bank money simply shifts payments services from private
to public arrangements, without aﬀecting interest rates, prices or economic
activity. This is equivalent to our arrangement in which  =  and interest
rates are nil. Wallace assumes, unlike us, that the government has the pos-
sibility of restricting the payments in the system through legal requirements.
On the other hand he assumes that the government system is constrained not
12Rochet and Tirole (1996) consider the potential for both competition and complemen-
tarity between CHIPS and Fedwire.
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to incur losses. Under these circumstances, there is an upper bound on the
interest rate on default free securities when they co exist with non interest
bearing government currency.
Sargent and Wallace (1982) use the overlapping generations framework
of Samuelson (1958) to examine the “real-bills doctrine.” In their framework,
a fiat currency can compete with private credit instruments. Diﬀerences in
endowments in alternating generations lead to a natural variation in relative
prices of consumption good in adjacent periods. If fiat money and private
lending coexist, then the return on the two must be the same, that is, the
nominal interest rate on lending must be zero. When a monetary equilib-
rium exists there are a continuum of equilibria in general, each consistent
with a diﬀerent initial value of a unit of fiat money. Monetary equilibria ex-
ist as long as the population is not “too impatient.” In all of these monetary
equilibria but one, the value of money goes asymptotically to zero. In the
remaining equilibrium, the value of money remains stationary, fluctuating
with the periodicity of endowments; goods prices and money stock are pos-
itively correlated. (In addition there is always a nonmonetary equilibrium,
in which private borrowing and lending occurs, but money does not eﬀect
intergenerational changes.) Sargent and Wallace then consider a restriction
so that some households cannot engage in private lending (because of a min-
imum restriction on the size of privately issued securities), forcing them to
hold government issued securities. If these securities have lower return than
private securities in equilbrium, rich savers hold the private securities, and
the diﬀerence in returns implies suboptimal equilibria, despite the fact that
by constraining the poor lenders from the market, price fluctuation can be
eliminated. Sargent and Wallace argue that use of government borrowing at
low levels will undo the restriction on small bills.
Goodhart (2000) considers the role of central bank in a world where elec-
tronic payments have become dominant. He has two arguments in favor
of the continuing importance of the central bank: the first is that currency
and electronic moneys are imperfect substitutes, particularly with regard to
privacy. The second, which he contrasts to “free banking” approaches of the
papers described above, is that a central bank, as a bank for a government,
is able to run losses financed by the govenment’s tax levying powers. Using
the government’s deep pockets, the central bank can always wrest control of
the money supply from the private provides by standing ready to engage in
loss-making open market operations. The public’s knowledge of the bank’s
power to do so, means that in fact these activities do not need to be car-
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ried out much of the time; instead the bank can engage in “open-mouth”
operations. Goodhart has in mind the exchange of central bank notes for
government debt, or possibly the purchase of private bank debt. However,
as we have seen, in a world where provision of private bank debt is only con-
strained by the availability of collateralizable assets the crucial determinant
of the power of a central bank to restrict the money supply is the elasticity
of the supply of collateralizable assets.
The issue of the role of cross-border collateral has been examined in sev-
eral papers by central bankers. Manning and Willison (2006) examine cross-
country provision of collateral, when collateral is expensive, banks engage in
activity in multiple countries, and delay in payment is costly. They show
that in many circumstances permitting cross-border collateral induces banks
to increase the pool of collateral available for backing payments. This be-
comes important in the case where there is uncertainty in the overall demand
for payment.
7 Conclusions
This paper has developed a model in which technologies for eﬀecting pay-
ment provide real benefits to an economy. Ultimately through its powers of
taxation, a government may have a natural comparative advantage in gen-
erating assets that can be used for payment. To the extent that it has a
monopoly power over these assets, its choices for pricing them–in eﬀect, its
monetary policy–will have real eﬀects on an economy. This power becomes
the leverage with which a monetary authority can encourage or discourage
economic activity in order to achieve policy goals.
However, when there exist alternative, non-public means of eﬀecting pay-
ments, the central authority’s power to aﬀect economic activity becomes lim-
ited. When, in an attempt to reduce activity, a central bank makes payments
assets more expensive, either by increasing the spread between borrowing and
lending rates on the asset, or increasing the haircut required in terms of col-
lateral, agents readjust by substituting away from public payment systems
into private ones. As private systems become more eﬀective at handling pay-
ment services, the leeway available to central banks in maintaining restrictive
monetary policies is reduced.
In the framework as analyzed thus far, we have assumed that a single
public entity competes with private payment providers. In the world today,
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in fact, the situation is more complicated: rather than a single public entity,
we in fact have multiple public entities providing payment services, in eﬀect,
sequentially, through the course of the day. Extensions to this model will
examine the implications for cross-border use of collateral in a world of round-
the-clock payments activity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Trustworthy Agents: Walrasian Model
When individuals can borrow subject only to their overall budget constraint,
the equilibrium reduces to a Walrasian equilibrium. In this Walrasian equi-
librium, let  ( even) represent the price of morning goods produced and
delivered in time  Let  ( odd) represent the price of afternoon goods
produced and delivered in time  and let +2 represent the price of morning
good produced in period  and sold in period + 2
In the Walrasian equilibrium, markets clear, and choices maximize ex-
pected utility of consumers:
max0112222
−0+(1−)(1)−1−(1−)2−2+(1−)2+2
subject to
00−1(1−)1+11+2(1−)2+22−2(1−)2−22 ≤ 0
and to 1 1 2 2 non negative.
From this we have the following conditions where  is the Lagrange mul-
tiplier on the budget constraint, and where paired inequalities hold with
complementary slackness:
−1 + 0 = 0
−1 + 1 ≤ 0; 1 ≥ 0
0(1)− 1 = 0
− + 2 = 0
− 2 ≤ 0; 2 ≥ 0 for  =  
The profit maximization problem for producers using the storage tech-
nology:
max0≥0
−00 + 20
yields the additional condition
0 ≥ 2
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with strict inequality only if no morning good is stored for later consumption.
The Inada conditions mean that in equilibrium 1  0 Thus the conditions
simplify to
1
0 = 1
0(∗) = 1
2
0 = 
 ≤ 20 ≤ 1
The conditions for market clearing are
1 = (1− )1
2 + (1− )2 = 0
0 = 2 + (1− )2
From the last condition, if 0  0 then one of the terms on the right side
must be positive as well, and therefore  = 20 But then storage is
positive so 20 = 1 a contradiction. The price +2 in the text is simply22
A.2 A General Model
The models we examine in the text can all be regarded as special cases of
the following equilibrium problem.
Agents choose these quantities:
 net production of morning good in period 0.
 and  amounts of period 0 morning good production used as collateral
in government and private payments systems, respectively.
 and  amounts of period 1 afternoon good produced and sold in
return for payments in government and private payments arrangements, re-
spectively.
 and  amounts of period 1 afternoon good purchased in return for
payments in government and private payments arrangements, respectively.
 and  net consumption of period 2 morning good, by consumers and
producers (“buyers” and “sellers”) of period 1 afternoon good.
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2 and 2 final nominal holdings of money balances by buyers and
sellers.
 and  can be positive or negative; all other quantities are non-negative.
These choices are made to maximize expected utility
−+(1−)(+)−(+)+(+)+(1−)(+22 )+(+
2
2 )
The fact that final money balances are in the objective function is in this
case innocuous: if we were to work through a recursive dynamic programming
problem, we would conclude that 12 is simply the shadow value of money
in the next period’s value function.
Prices in the model are as follows:
0,2 money prices of newly produced morning good in periods 0 and 2.
1, money price of afternoon good in period 1.
12 price in terms of next period money of a collateralized loan for the
purchase of one unit of afternoon good in period 1.
  interest rates paid to (from) the government for overnight money
balances, set by the government along with the government collateral re-
quirements. Following Berentsen and Monnet, it is convenient to use the
proportional spread between interest rates
∆ = 1 + 
1 + 
as one indicator of the government’s policy.
With interest paid in money, there is no guarantee that the nominal sup-
ply of outside money is the same from period to period. For completeness
therefore we need to consider the possibility that the government distributes
or collects money balances from the population. Assume that at the begin-
ning of period 2, the government collects (distributes, if negative) in a lump
sum fashion  nominal units of money per person. Given the quasilinearity
of agent preferences, this has no eﬀect on decisions other than the rebalancing
of money holdings that occurs each morning.
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Market clearing conditions are as follows:
−  −  = 0
(1− ) = 
(1− ) = 
(1− ) +  = 0
(1− )2 + 2 = 2
In the last condition, 2 is the nominal supply of money in the final
period. (This last condition is redundant, given budget constraints). Agents
borrow money from or lend money to the government in period 1. There
are two budget constraints, one for agents who turn out to be consumers in
period 1 and one for agents who turn out to be producers in period 1.
(1 + )[0 + 0(−  − )− 1]+ − (1 + )[1 −0 − 0(−  − )]+
−12 −  ≥ 2 +2 (7)
(1 + )(0 + 0(−  − ) + 1) + 12 −  ≥ 2 +2 (8)
The first two terms of the consumer’s budget constraint (7) take into account
the wedge between government borrowing and lending rates. (The wedge
applies to producers as well, but it can be shown that producers never need
to borrow from the government in equilibrium, so only one price is relevant
for them). As long as ∆ ≥ 1  we can exploit the convexity of the budget set,
and write the consumer budget constraint more tractably as two constraints:
(1 + )[0 + 0(−  − )− 1]− 12 −  ≥ 2 +2 (9)
(1 + )[0 + 0(−  − )− 1]− 12 −  ≥ 2 +2 (10)
where the first binds if the consumer is a net lender to the government, and
the second binds if the consumer is a net borrower from the government.
In addition, buyers face two collateral constraints, one for expenditures
in private systems and one for expenditures in the government system:
(1 + )(0 + 0(−  − )− 1) + 2 ≥ 0 (11)
−12 + 2−1() ≥ 0 (12)
26
In constraint (11) the absolute value of the first term is the cash value in the
second period of the collateral the buyer must deposit. The third component
of that term is the net cash position as of period 1: intial holdings plus any
profits made from morning sales less the dollars used to purchase afternoon
good. This amount is multiplied by the interest rate on overnight cash bor-
rowing from the government; for each dollar to be repaid (including interest),
 dollars worth of collateral must be deposited with the government. A unit
of collateral is worth 2 dollars in period 2, so the second term is the value
actually deposited, and in eﬀect this condition indicates the necessary level
of collateral  Similarly, constraint (12) says that the value of collateral in
the private system must be suﬃcient to back the real value of purchases of
afternoon good made in that system.
Let the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (8-12) be, respectively, 
1 2  
Finally, there is a government budget constraint (equivalently an equation
describing the dynamics of the supply of money):
2 = (1− )(1 + )[0 − 1]+ − (1− )(1 + )[1 −0]+
+0(1 + ) + (1− )1(1 + )− 
= 0(1 + )−  − (1− )( − )[1 −0]+
In words, sellers deposit 0 + 1 units of money overnight with the gov-
ernment and receive interest  on these holdings. If buyers spend less than
their initial holdings, they too receive interest on the balance; if their mon-
etary expenditures exceed their initial balances, they pay interest. In the
morning of period 2, depositors receive their money back, borrowers return
their money, all pay lump sum taxes, and the remaining balance constitutes
the terminal money supply.
First order conditions are as follows:
−−10 + (1 + )( + 1) + (1 + )(2 + ) = 0 ()
−11 (1− )0( + )− (1 + )1 − (1 + )(2 + ) ≤ 0 ()
−112 (1− )0( + )− 1 − 2 −  ≤ 0 ()
−+ 1(1 + ) ≤ 0 ()
−+ 12 ≤ 0 ()
(1− ) − 2(1 + 2) = 0 ()
 − 2 = 0 ()
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− 0((1 + )( + 1) + (1 + )(2 + )) + 2 ≤ 0 ()
− 0((1 + )( + 1) + (1 + )(2 + ))
+ [(−1)0()]2 ≤ 0 ()
The label at the right indicates that the equation is the first order condition
with respect to this variable; in the case of inequalities this variable must
be equal to or greater than zero with complementary slackness. (First order
conditions on 2 are redundant.) Simplifying,
−−10 + (1 + )( + 1) + (1 + )(2 + ) = 0 ()
−11 (1− )0( + )− −10 + −12 (1 + ) ≤ 0 ()
−112 (1− )0( + )− −12 (1− ) −  ≤ 0 ()
1(1 + ) ≤ 2 ()
12 ≤ 2 ()
− 1 + 2 ≤ 0 ()
− 1 + [(−1)0()]2 ≤ 0 ()
1 + 2 = (1− )2 ()
 = 2 ()
A.3 Absence of Government Payment System
Proof of propositions 1 and 2. In this section, we assume that () is
the linear function We impose the additional constraint that  (and thus
 and  ) are zero, as are policy variables  0  and  The Inada
conditions on  guarantee that  and therefore  is positive. Therefore
12 = 2 and the conditions simplify to
02 =  ()
(1− )(0()− 1) = 2 ()
2 ≤ (−1 − ) ()
Note therefore 0
2 = 
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If   0 then the conditions reduce to
0() = (()
−1 − 1)
1−  + 1 (13)
Given the Inada conditions,  = 0 only if  = 0 and so the above conditions
applies, demonstrating the first part of Proposition 1.
The formulation does not include the possibility of trading old goods
stored until period two for new goods in period two, but it is easy to de-
termine the pricing if such trades were included. Since all agents regard
old goods as perfect substitutes for new goods at a rate of  it must be
that +2 ≥  with equality if old goods are carried into period two. Thus+2   only if  = 0 But in this case, if +2  −1 producing in period
zero for sale in period 2 becomes infinitely profitable. These two restrictions
establish the final claim of Proposition 1.
As noted in the text, the case  = 1 is equivalent to commodity payment.
In this case, +1 is defined by condition (12) to be equal to 212 = 
A.4 Government Monopoly on Money
In this section, we impose the constraint that  (and thus  and ) are
zero. In general the outcomes divide into cases depending on whether the real
value of money in a particular period is suﬃcient to carry out all purchases
in a costless fashion, and if not, whether the shortfall is extreme enough to
make it worthwhile to borrow costly additional money–that is, on whether
0 is greater than, equal to, or less than 1
We now present the analysis in detail; the results described in the text
are the special case where 0 = 0 To avoid arbitrage opportunities, the
government is restricted to combinations (∆ ) satisfying
∆ ≥ 1
1 + (()−1 − 1) 
For simplicity we will confine attention to the case ∆ ≥ 1
2 is exogenous to the problem; consider it to be set by having the mon-
etary authority manage expectations of future prices. Note therefore, that
the policy of the monetary authority establishes a real supply of money as
of period 2. For each possible value of 2 the equilibrium will establish
values for period 0 and period 1 prices. The problem then can be repeated
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for periods 2 and 3 given a real money supply expected for period 4 and so
forth.
Given the Inada conditions on  the first order conditions are as follows:
−−10 + (1 + )( + 1) + (1 + )(2 + ) = 0 ()
−11 (1− )0()− −10 + −12 (1 + ) = 0 ()
1(1 + ) = 2 ()
(− 1) + 2 ≤ 0 ()
1 + 2 = (1− )2 ()
 = 2 ()
where  = 0 unless the inequality holds strictly. Note therefore that
1 = 2(1 + ) (14)
in other words, the price of afternoon good 1 guarantees that producers
make zero profit: the present value of the sales (including the overnight
interest ) is equal to the cost of production.
First, suppose that in equilibrium, the afternoon consumers are net lenders
to the government–that is,
0 + 0(− )− 1  0
This means that 2 = 0 and 1  0 and thus the collateral constraint is
not binding:  = 0 and so  = 0 Conditions reduce to
(1 + ) = 20 (15)
0() = 1 (16)
In this region there is no opportunity cost to holding money balances–
that is, prices fall according to the Friedman rule and  = ∗ the full-trust
level of production. For the collateral constraint not to be binding, the
money supply must be large enough that the amount held by each individual
is suﬃcient to purchase his level of afternoon good, (should he turn out to
be a buyer):
0 ≥ ∗1 = ∗ 2(1 + )
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As long as prices are anticipated to be suﬃciently low in the second period,
this unconstrained equilibrium occurs. In this case, before taxes, money
supply grows at the rate of interest on deposits, so we can also write
2 + 
2 ≥
∗

thinking of the left side of this inequality as the “overnight” real money
supply, with the taxes collected the next morning.
Next consider the case where afternoon consumers borrow from the government–
that is,
0 + 0(− )− 1  0
Then 1 = 0 2  0 and either  = 0 or   0. Either way, conditions
reduce to
2
0 = (1 + ) + (1− )(1 + ) + (()
−1 − 1)(1 + ) (17)
0() = ∆(1 +  ()
−1 − 1
1−  ) (18)
and 0
2 

(1 + ) 
Equations (4-5) of the text are then the special case where  = 0
If buyers borrow money from the government, it must be that the initial
real money supply is below the critical level needed to purchase  When
 =  and  = 1  is the barter level ˜ although the availability of outside
money will reduce the amount of collateral needed to reach this production,
relative to the case of commodity payment. The critical level decreases as
the spread between rates grows; it also decreases as collateral requirements
increase. If the money supply is below this critical level, no matter how
far, the level of afternoon production  remains fixed at the particular lower
level defined by (18). The afternoon money supply cannot sink below the
critical level; instead collateralized borrowing makes up the diﬀerence. In
this region, even if  = , inflation is greater than the Friedman rule (that
is, agents prefer not to hold additional nominal balances beyond those needed
for payments purposes). As Berentsen and Monnet note, the spread between
lending and borrowing rates has a real eﬀect: wider spreads reduce economic
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activity. However, holding the proportional spread fixed, the levels of interest
rates simply aﬀect inflation (17).
Finally, if the money supply starts at an intermediate level, so that
∆(1 +  ()
−1 − 1
1−  )  
0
µ0(1 + )
2
¶
 1 (19)
then afternoon consumers neither borrow from nor lend to the government.
In this case,  = 0 (no collateralized borrowing takes place),
 = ( −−1)−12 
and conditions simplify to
 = 0(1 + )2 (20)
2
0 = ((1− )
0() + )(1 + ) (21)
In this intermediate region, the rate of inflation and the level of production
both depend on the interest rate paid on deposits (but not on the interest rate
the government demands for collateralized borrowing, since none occurs).
Given second period prices, higher deposit rates increase economic activity.
The eﬀect on inflation is ambiguous; the interest rate on deposits contributes
directly to its increase, but by reducing the collateral constraint, it incresases
prices today relative to tomorrow. The bounds on 0 in (19) in eﬀect place
upper and lower bounds on the rate of change of prices in the economy.
As noted, the case described in the text is simply the special case of
0 = 0 and
 = −1(1− )( − )
–that is, the government redistributes to the population the excess in in-
terest received over interest paid. In this case, the expected price level in
period 2 has no real eﬀect on the economy. When there is outside money in
the system, the level of 2 has real eﬀects, since the real supply of money
reduces the need for collateral.
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A.4.1 Steady state money growth
Berentsen andMonnet focus on the case where the real money supply remains
constant. In eﬀect, this is an extra condition pinning down 2 Agents start
with 0
Define  = 2 There are two cases to consider, depending on whether
collateral is used in the steady state. First consider the case where collateral
is not used. In such a steady state,
20 = 1 + 
1 + 
Equating money growth with inflation (equation (21)) we conclude that
((1− )0() + ) = 1
1 +   (22)
In other words, conditional on being in a steady state with no collateral, the
level of real activity is completely determined by the fraction of money that
the government removes from the economy through taxes in each round. Let
ˆ() be the amount implicitly defined in (22). In this region, increases in
taxes move the steady state closer to the eﬃcient level. For there to be an
equilibrium of this form it is necessary and suﬃcient that the level of activity
be limited to the intermediate region described by (19); that is, government
policy variables (∆    ) are restricted by the following conditions:
 ≤ 1
1 +  ≤ (∆(1− ) + ) + (
−1 − )
(Since the rate of return on money is limited by the discount factor  at-
tempts to shrink the nominal money supply faster than permitted by left
limit are inconsistent with the maximum possible deflation in steady state.)
Since the per capita money stock in this middle case is spent on afternoon
consumption, ˆ() determines the price level, and thus the real supply of
money:
0
0 =
2
2 =
ˆ()
(1 + ) 
Next consider the case where collateral is used. In this case,
1
1 +   (∆(1− ) + ) + (
−1 − )
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and the condition for a steady state is now
[(1 + ) + (1− )(1 + )− (1− )( − )10 ](1 + )
−1 =
2
0
where 20 and  satisfy (17-18). Substituting for 1 from (14) it can be
verified that the condition picks out a unique real money supply 00 for
each ,   , and 
A.5 Competition between public and private inside
money
Now return to the assumption0 = 0 Given the market clearing conditions
this has the immediate consequence that consumers can not be net lenders
of cash to the government, and thus condition (9) is redundant and we can
set 1 = 0 First order conditions reduce to
(1 + ) + (1 + )((1− ) + 2) = 20 ()
−11 (1− )0( + )− (1− )(1 + )−12 − (1 + ) ≤ 0 ()
−112 (1− )0( + )− −12 (1− ) −  ≤ 0 ()
1(1 + ) ≤ 2 ()
12 ≤ 2 ()
− 1 + −12 ≤ 0 ()
− 1 + [(−1)0()]2 ≤ 0 ()
2 = (1− )2 ()
 = 2 ()
By the Inada conditions, either  or  must be positive.
Case I: If   0  then   0 and from the collateral constraint
  0 Then the constraints corresponding to each of these variables hold
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with equality. The equalities simplify to
2
1 = (1 + )
2 = (−1 − )
2
0 = (1 + ) + (1− )(1 + ) + (
−1 − )(1 + )
0( + ) = ∆(1 + (()
−1 − 1)
1−  )
Thus, if the government payments system is used, its policy parameters (∆ )
determine the overall level of economic activity  +  For this to be the
case, the remaining three inequality conditions must be satisfied.
Values of 12 and  can be found to satisfy them, if and only if the
following condition is satisfied:
∆(1 + (()
−1 − 1)
1−  ) ≤ 1 + 
0
µ

¶
()−1 − 1
1−  
In this case, any value of 12 in the following range is consistent with equi-
librium:
∆ (1− ) + (()
−1 − 1)
(1− ) + (()−1 − 1)0 ≤ 
12
2 ≤ 1
Note that in the monetary equilibrium, price levels are indeterminate,
although inflation is determined by levels of interest rates set by the gov-
ernment. Real monetary balances held overnight, however are well defined;
they are equal to the amounts borrowed to purchase 
Case II: If  = 0  then  = 0 and with zero purchases through
the government system, it is optimal for agents to choose  = 0 By Inada
conditions,   0 and so  and  are positive as well. The equality
constraints now reduce to
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12
2 = 
−1
2 = (−1 − )0
2
0 = (1 + ) + (1− )(1 + ) + 2(1 + )
0()− 1
0(−1) =
()−1 − 1
1− 
and since the left side of the last equality is a decreasing function of  it
uniquely determines To ensure this is an equilibrium, we need to establish
the conditions under which a consistent set of shadow prices can be deter-
mined for the unused markets. Solutions for the remaining constraints can
be found if and only if
∆(1 + (()
−1 − 1)
1−  ) ≥ 1 + 
0
µ

¶
()−1 − 1
1−  
In which case the inequality constraints reduce to the conditions that 0
and 1 be chosen in the following ranges:
∆ (1− ) + (()
−1 − 1)
(1− ) + (()−1 − 1)0 ≥
2
1(1 + ) ≥ 1
(1+)+21 (
0(()−1−1)+(1−)) ≤ 20 ≤ (1+)+(1−)(1+)+(
−1−)
Although the activity is determined, the money price levels, and even
inflation rates, are underdetermined–not surprising since we are positing an
equilibrium in which money is not going to be used.
However the real return from private lending is determined to be −1− 1
by the condition for 122 and this is the only relevant relative price for
trading in the economy when the public payment system is not used.
These calculations lead to the following theorem
Theorem 3 Assume () is strictly convex. Then the equilibrium quantities
are unique and equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
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1) If
∆(1 + (()
−1 − 1)
1−  ) ≤ 1 + 
0 (0)
()−1 − 1
1−  
then agents only use the government payment system (otherwise they use the
private system at least in part).
2) If
∆(1 + (()
−1 − 1)
1−  )  1 + 
0 (ˆ) ()
−1 − 1
1−  
where
0(ˆ) = ∆(1 + (()
−1 − 1)
1−  )
then agents use the government system at least in part, and in equilibrium
 +  = ˆ Otherwise they use the private system exclusively, and  ≥ ˆ
Note that as ∆ increases, or  increases, use of the private system in-
creases at the expense of the government system.
Theorem 4 (Case of linear costs). Suppose () =  If
∆(1 +  ()
−1 − 1
1−  ) = 1 + 
()−1 − 1
1−  
there are multiple equilibria, in which the private and public system coexist.
Otherwise the equilibrium quantities are unique. If the left side is larger,
then the equilibrium has only private payments. If the right side is larger the
equilibrium has only public payments.
In particular, if the equilibrium involves only public payments, it is a
special case of that described in the previous section. If it involves only
private payments, then it reduces to condition (13) of Appendix A.3 and the
values described in the text follow from the above calculations.
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